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Tfie author demonstrates how Nobel Laureate Ilya Prigogine's pioneering work on dissi-
pative structures and non-equilibrium thermodynamics might be used to answer theological
questions about contingency and irreversibility that theologian WolfJiart Pannenberg posed
to scientists twenty years ago. Prigogine 's reformulation ofclassical dynamics and his math-
ematical model of irreversibility seem to corroborate Pannenberg 's claim that natural phe-
nomena must be both contingent and irreversible, if the Christain worldview is correct. Tlie
writings of Prigogine and Pannenberg provide an interesting example of the methodological
difficulties encountered when comparing scientific and theological worldviews.
The influence of Protestant theologian
Wolfhart Pannenberg stems largely from his
daring attempts to bring theology into produc-
tive dialogue with branches of knowledge
from which it is often considered estranged.'
Although he is best known for his belief that
the study of the Christian gospel cannot be
divorced from the study of history,^
Pannenberg's conviction that natural theology
occupies an indispensable place in Christian
scholarship is equally significant.
In many American universities, theol-
ogy—the study of the world in the light of
religious doctrine— has been replaced by re-
ligious studies — the study of religion in
worldly terms.^ God-of-the-Gaps theologies,
which enjoyed limited popular resurgence
following the development of quantmn me-
chanics, were quickly recognized as futile at-
tempts to resurrect an image of God that no
longer enjoys the public's confidence." More
commonly, theologians today— and their sci-
entific colleagues— take the position that the-
ology and science caimot communicate one
with the other because they are separate ap-
proaches to knowledge with incommensu-
rable methodologies.^ Pannenberg recognizes
that, given the limitations of science's mate-
rialistic worldview, the alienation of science
from theology is as unsatisfactory and unre-
alistic as theological attempts to dispute sci-
entific evidence. Theology must develop a
satisfactory means of engaging with science
if it hopes to make relevant and credible as-
sessments of twenty-first century science.
One of Pannenberg's boldest attempts to
foster such engagement is his 1981 Zygon ar-
ticle, "Theological Questions to Scientists."
There he poses the following questions:
1
.
Is it conceivable, in view of the
importance of contingency in natural
processes, to revise the principle of
inertia or at least its interpretation?
2. Is the reality of nature to be under-
stood as contingent, and are natural
processes to be understood as irrevers-
ible?
3. Is there any equivalent in modem
biology of the biblical notion of the
divine spirit as the origin of life that
transcends the limits of the organism?
4. Is there any positive relation
conceivable of the concept of eternity to
the spatiotemporal structure of the
physical universe?
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5. Is the Christian affirmation of an
imminent end of this world that in some
way invades the present somehow
reconcilable with scientific extrapola-
tions of the continuing existence of the
universe for at least several billion
years ahead?^
These questions pose a remarkable chal-
lenge to scientists and theologians.
Pannenberg contends that Christian theology
presumes affirmative answers to these ques-
tions, thereby explicitly opening itself to chal-
lenges from science. Nor does he fail to rec-
ognize what is at stake in his position:
If the God of the Bible is the creator of
the universe, then it is not possible to
understand fully or even appropriately
the processes of nature without any
reference to that God. If, on the
contrary, nature can be appropriately
understood without reference to the God
of the Bible, then that God cannot be
creator of the universe, and consequently
he cannot be truly God and be trusted as
a source of moral teaching either.'
This statement insists that complementary
communication between science and theology
is not only possible, but that scientific and
theological knowledge can, do, and must af-
fect one another. Negative answers to any of
the above questions would require Christians
to rework or abandon several of their forma-
tive presuppositions. Pannenberg 's questions
identify areas in which theology must parley
with science, if it is to move closer toward
the Truth it seeks to understand.
The questions have received surprisingly
little attention in the past twenty years. 1
know of just one unsatisfactory attempt to
answer them.^ In this paper, I attempt to an-
swer Pamienberg's second question by exam-
ining the work of physical chemist Ilya
Prigogine, whose work on irreversibility and
non-equilibrium dynamics affirms
Paimenberg's suppositions. It also addresses
certain methodological problems encountered
when any two theories with such radically
different concerns, conventions, and histories
as physical chemistry and philosophical the-
ology are considered together. First, I shall
explore the motivations behind Pannenberg's
second question.
Paimenberg speculates at some length on
the theological reasons for believing in an ir-
reversible, contingent reality: "The theologi-
cal claim of divine creation implies that the
whole world is contingent." ^ Any model of
the world in which the future is fully contained
in the present is incompatible with the Chris-
tian doctrine of creation. '° God's freedom
must extend to all parts of the world, even to
the creation of the world itself."
As an outgrowth of this view, Pannenberg
maintains the contingency not only of events,
but of physical laws and properties as well. A
contingent world cannot be governed by nec-
essary physical laws and so cannot be com-
pletely predictable a priori from scientific rea-
soning. Pannenberg therefore uses the Huraean
term regularities to refer to physical laws. His
use of the term follows from the assertion that
every observed regular physical relationship
depends upon God to sustain its validity. If
the laws physics postulates as absolute admit
for the contingency of actions, room still ex-
ists for meaningful divine action in the world.
As Pannenberg writes in Systematic Theology:
Theology, then. . .identifies the
contingency of events both in detail and
in the world as a whole as the expres-
sion of the creative activity of the
Biblical God who acts in history. Even
the rise of uniform processes that can
be described in law formulas may then
be seen by theology as a contingent
positing of the creator. In this respect
theology can appeal to the fact that
cosmic processes characterized by the
irreversibility of the flow of time,
regular processes and scientific
observation must have taken place for
the first time in order to be then locked
in [first instantiation].'^
Scientific laws are manifestations of
God's will to sustain order. Pannenberg goes
further than Liberal Protestantism, since for
him observed physical regularities imply a
God who not only sustains the world but also
acts purposefully within it.'^
Pannenberg also urges scientists to ac-
knowledge the contingency of future events.''*
Importantly, "the freedom of the God who acts
in history finds expression in the contingency
of historical events," '^though this freedom
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exists on a level beyond human experience.
For Pannenberg, historical contingency encour-
ages a sense of wonder induced by an always-
novel creation. His theology of historical rev-
elation presupposes not only a unique creation
but a unique history, gradually actualized as
time progresses. ||
Writing at a time
when philosophers
were arguing vehe-
mently about the re-
ality of time and
tense, '^ Pannenberg
recognized that time
itself must be both
unique and irrevers-
ible for traditional
theologies to remain
coherent. %,
Irreversibility and contingency are, thus,
absolute requirements of Pannenberg's the-
ology. Despite his distinctive angle,
Pannenberg is in line here with the main-
stream of the Christian tradition.' '' A signifi-
cant contribution to the Enlightenment's dis-
illusionment with traditional Christianity
stemmed from the rejection of these assump-
tions in favor of Newtonian determinism.
Pannenberg's desire to reestablish them is,
therefore, understandable; and Prigogine's
insights into the nature of time should be
welcomed by all who find classical determin-
ism problematic.
Ilya Prigogine is best known for his in-
vestigation of non-equilibrium chemical sys-
tems, for which he won the Nobel Prize in
1977. Physical systems tend toward equihb-
rium, the point at which Gibbs free energy of
reaction is minimized.'^ Rather than mono-
tonically returning to equilibrium when per-
turbed, however, systems far from equilib-
rium often behave in unpredictable ways,
Prigogine discovered, and form dissipative
structures that spontaneously order them-
selves, exhibiting increasing complexity with
time. Simple dissipative structures, such as
the Brusselator and the Benard instability, can
be constructed in the laboratory.'^ These
structures are characteristic of open thermo-
dynamic systems, in which the second law
of thermodynamics.
AS>0,
where AS represents the change in entropy of
the system, does not apply. In the world of
everyday experience, "closed" -° systems,
Physical systems tend toward equilibrium.
Rather than monotonically returning to equi-
librium when perturbed, however, systemsfar
from equilibrium often behave in unpredict-
able ways andform dissipative structures that
spontaneously order themselves, exhibiting
increasing complexity with time.
which do follow the second law, are extremely
rare and ahnost always artificially constructed.
Thus, the solar system can be seen as a mas-
sive dissipative structure, constantly energized
and replenished by the sun.
Dissipative structures are formed when the
thermodynamic stability of physical systems
breaks down at certain bifurcation points far
from equilibrium. Prigogine has shown that,
because of apparent long-range correlations
among particles, the law of large numbers
breaks down at bifurcation points, so that the
new configurations that systems adopt beyond
these points are completely unpredictable.-'
For example, scientists can create Benard cells
in the lab, but they cannot predict whether the
cells will circulate in clockwise or counter-
clockwise direction.
Interpreting these structures presents prob-
lems for classical mechanics, which treats the
world as a system of rigid inertial bodies
whose position and momenta at any time f,
can be exactly calculated from precise knowl-
edge of their position and momenta at any
other time t^ between zero and infinity. The
time-symmetric, reversible, and determinis-
tic world of classical dynamics conflicts with
human experience.^'
Ludwig Boltzmann attempted to give ir-
reversibility a mathematical formulation"
with his equation.
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S = /fln[Q].
where S represents entropy. Zeis Boltzmann's
constant, and Q represents the number of pos-
sible states for a given system. Boltzmann's
theory, which has many applications and is
still widely used today, seemed to derive irre-
versibility from dynamics by adopting statis-
tical descriptions of physical processes. As
Henri Poincare and others pointed out, how-
ever, irreversibility cannot logically be deduced
from a time-reversible system like classical dy-
namics.-'* For Boltzmann, entropy and irrevers-
ibility were merely manifestations of improb-
ability and the impossibility of infinitely pre-
cise measurements. Given sufficient time, even
the most complex system would return to its
initial state.^ Even after the advent of quan-
tum mechanics, and despite criticisms by fig-
ures such as Max Planck,'^^ some scientists,
notably Einstein, remained enthralled with the
idea of a deterministic world in which one
could theoretically follow the trajectory of ev-
ery atom and particle and describe all motion.
While Einstein-Gibbs ensemble theory intro-
duced statistical descriptions and correlations
into quantum systems, it was developed only
to mitigate the lack of infinitely exact measure-
ments and still reflected belief in a determin-
istic world.
To demonstrate that determinism requires
infinitely precise measurement, Prigogine
uses the "baker transformation," -^ in which
any two points, no matter how close initially,
eventually diverge. Almost all physically real
systems are described by non-integrable equa-
tions and, therefore, behave in ways that can-
not be unpredicted, unless one has infinitely
exact initial data and can carry out calcula-
tions with infinite precision.^ The slightest
change or imcertainty in initial conditions (in-
cluding the use of coarse-graining in quan-
tum mechanics) makes it impossible to deter-
mine the time-evolution of non-integrable
systems.^' Because of the Heisenburg Uncer-
tainty Principle, even relatively simple prob-
lems like predicting rolls of the dice are in-
soluble, because the initial conditions of the
system cannot be measured exactly.^"
In contrast to most scientists, Prigogine
has always beheved that irreversibility is a real
feature of the world, rather than a by-product
of insufficient knowledge.^' He has described
time as a symmetry-breaking operator for
many years, but until recently he could only
cite human experience tojustify the observed
fact that humans live in a reality where sys-
tems tend toward equilibrium in the future
rather than in the past.^- Prigogine uses the
Liouville operator to track the evolution of
the density matrix p and the Perron-Frobenius
operator to track probability distributions in
systems with non-Hilbertian spectral repre-
sentations. In order to get a complete spec-
tral representation of the Perron-Frobenius
and Liouville operators, one must go beyond
Hilbert Space to consider complex eigenval-
ues. Even here, the spectral representation
of the Perron-Frobenius operator remains ir-
reducible. Priogine's extra-Hilbertian repre-
sentations determine that the operators can-
not be described in terms of classical trajec-
tories, but only in terms of probability distri-
butions.^^
It follows that one must use statistical de-
scriptions similar to the Gibbs-Einstein en-
semble approach, not because of imprecision,
but because the statistical description ob-
tained with the operator formalism is no
longer equivalent to the trajectory descrip-
tion fundamental to classical dynamics. Once
one leaves Hilbert Space for the more robust
Gelfand Space, the statistical description of
systems is revealed as basic, while the tra-
jectory description is merely a derivative
formed from the superposition of Fourier
plane waves with no inherent long-term fi-
delity. Even if exact measurements were
possible. Hamiltonians with complex eigen-
values could only be accurately described
using statistical methods.^'*
Irreversibility in natural systems, or
Large Poincare Systems (LPS),^^ ultimately
results from imperfect correlations among
particles. Particles that collide "remember"
the interaction after impact. Correlations can
subsist for long periods of time; but a deter-
ministic world requires indefinite retention
of all correlations, since a system's past is
completely contained in its present state.
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Because of Poincare resonances, infinite
correlations among atoms cannot occur.^^ In
his three-body proof, Poincare showed that
frequencies in complex systems take the
form
where oj^ and co^ represent the frequencies, and
n^nd n^ represent nonvanishing integers, so
that when
n^co^ + n^ojg =
the system is undefmed.^^ These resonances
are non-localized phenomena and so cannot
be described by classical dynamics. Thus, for
non-integrable systems the breakdown of
long-range correlations points to the inad-
equacy of classical trajectories. Accurate de-
scription requires a statistical treatment, and
even then cannot accommodate infinite cor-
relations. Poincare reso- t
nances, therefore, break
time-symmetry and build
the one-way nature of
time into the nature of
physical processes.
On the quantum
level. Prigogine uses an
analogous approach to
integrate irreversibility into the traditional
theory based on Schrodinger's equation. For
quantum mechanical systems, leaving Hilbert
Space is not sufficient to break the time-sym-
metric nature of the solutions to the Hamil-
tonians. Prigogine and his colleagues sug-
gest a radical revision of the spectrometric
basis of quantum mechanics inherited from
Niels Bohr's conception of the atom.
Prigogine says that he does "solve the
Liouville eigenvalue problem for LPS in the
context of more general function spaces." ^^
but the consequences of breaking time-sym-
metry are extreme:
• The eigenvalues of the Liouville
operator are no longer differences
between the eigenvalues of the
Hamiltonian, which are obtained from
the Schrodinger equation. Therefore,
the Ritz-Rydberg principle is violated,
whereby the systems are no longer
integrable and the approach to equilib-
rium is possible.
• The quantum superposition principle
associated with the linearity of the
Schrodinger equation is violated.
• The eigenfunctions of the Liouville
operator are not expressed in terms of
probability amplitudes or wave
functions, but rather in terms of
probabilities proper.^^
Prigogine's theory, therefore, shows that
human inability to predict the evolution of
non-integrable systems results not from a
lack of information, but from the fundamen-
tally statistical nature of large systems.
Time's irreversibility prevents an exact, non-
statistical deduction of future states from
knowledge of present conditions. Accord-
ing to Prigogine, therefore, events in the uni-
verse are fundamentally irreversible as well
as contingent— no being, even an infinitely
Ifclassical and quantum dynamics have
been empirically discredited, perhaps the
metaphysical belief in universal simplicity
and intelligibility that inspired them
should also be revised.
intelligent "Laplacian demon," can predict
the future, unless its vision transcends time
itself.^
Pannenberg's second question has been
answered affirmatively by a Nobel Laureate.
Pannenberg's own speculation on the second
question could have been written by
Prigogine: "contingency and irreversibility
may have their common root [in the irrevers-
ibility of time]." "' Pannenberg and Prigogine
agree that the world is irreversible, and that
the future is not wholly determined by the
present.
Despite this conformance. Prigogine and
Pannenberg's claims are built on very differ-
ent metaphysical and methodological assump-
tions, and this underlying baggage must be
unpacked to understand how their views re-
late in detail. Prigogine's work has been con-
fined to the scientific realm of non-equilib-
rium systems. He employs the highly techni-
cal, strictly phenomenological jargon of pro-
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fessional physics, which cannot address the
logical necessity of either physical laws or the
universe itself. He considers his new irrevers-
ible dynamics to be a better empirical formu-
lation of entropy and. thus, a truer represen-
tation of reality.'*" He recognizes that knowl-
edge requires a knower but believes that
knowledge is "both objective and participa-
tory," "^ for although scientists draw inferences
from regularities, they are not themselves re-
sponsible for creating the
regularities,'*^ even
though regularities "do
not correspond to a logi-
cal or epistemological
truth." ''^ Many scien-
tists still accept this myth
of objectivity, but even
those who applaud the
empiricism of academic
science must acknowledge the need for non-
scientific presuppositions. "** Scientists, of
course, have the right to draw epistemelogical
or metaphysical conclusions from their
work,''^ as long as they recognize that such
conclusions are not scientifically warranted."**^
Yet if classical and quantum dynamics have
been empirically discredited, perhaps the
metaphysical beUef in universal simpUcity and
intelligibility that inspired them should also
be revised.
Pannenberg shares Prigogine's belief in a
reality that is contingent and irreversible, but
his grounds for doing so stem from the apriori
givenness of God, rather than the a posteriori
evidence of experiments. For Pannenberg,
theology augments other disciplines by pro-
viding insight into their distinctly personal
aspects."*^ Physics, thus, remains incomplete
without the complementary insight that the-
ology provides. Still, theology's dependence
on personal revelation makes constructing
statements recognized as universally appli-
cable very difficult.
Prigogine points out that our world is an
open system in which entropy and irrevers-
ibility drive increasing complexity and or-
der. The development of life on earth, the
evolution of society and culture, and even
the observed universe are all large-scale dis-
sipative structures made possible by time's
irreversibility.^" The alternative to contin-
gent reality would be a changeless existence
with no place for a concept of the human
being.
Pannenberg agrees with Prigogine that
entropy is a mixed blessing, giving rise not
only to creativity and orderly existence, but
also to destruction and physical finitude.^'
Prigogine and Pannenberg workfrom
very different presuppositions; and
though they have certainly not reached
intellectual common ground^ they share
intellectual office space on the question
ofphysical contingency.
However, while theology can directly explore
the intuitive perception of entropy in the
world, science cannot cope with ideas that are
not identified and reified via testable math-
ematical relationships. This methodological
weakness motivates scientists' perennial at-
tempts to deny entropy and irreversibility and
has motivated Prigogine's work to reinvent
dynamics. As a human, he knows entropy
must be real; yet as a scientist, he cannot un-
derstand entropy until it has been mathemati-
cally described in terms of physical data.
Pannenberg's arguments contain no such ten-
sion. Prigogine and Pannenberg work from
very different presuppositions; and though
they have certainly not reached intellectual
common ground, they share intellectual of-
fice space on the question of physical contin-
gency.
Pannenberg and Prigogine do disagree in
important areas; the most important disagree-
ment stems from Pannenberg's theology of
history. ^^ For Pannenberg, true existence ex-
tends beyond the present and resonates
throughout time. Human existence is only
partially contained in the present, since events
are inseparable from their teleological signifi-
cance and antecedent conditions. ^^ God's ul-
timate purpose for creation can be understood
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only at the eschaton, when history will be seen
in its totality. This purpose, however, has been
revealed proleptically through the Resurrec-
tion for the benefit of all humanity. Finally,
Pannenberg maintains that the future retroac-
tively reformulates and reconstitutes the
present in light of God's eschatological goal.
The future's contingency allows creation to
enter freely into an open future and allows
God the freedom to sustain creation and in-
corporate it into the divine eschatological
end.^
This retroactive future contradicts
Prigogine's assertion that information can
flow only in one direction:
A time-reversible world would be an un-
knowable world. Knowledge presupposes
that the world affects us and our
instruments. . .and that this interaction creates
a difference between past and future.^^
While God's retroactivity is one of the
most difficult areas in Pannenberg's theology,
theories of retroactive causation can be for-
mulated in realist causal philosophies.^ Per-
haps Pannenberg must endure criticism with
the hope that future scholarship will retroac-
tively vindicate his present position.^
Another conflict in Prigogine and
Pannenberg's thought arises from their differ-
ent understandings of time's relation to real-
ity. Prigogine believes time, or at least irre-
versible processes, is endless and fundamen-
tal to reality.^ Abandoning creatio ex nihilo
for creatio ex temporis, Prigogine endorses
the Tyron-Brout "free lunch" cosmology, in
which an initial instability creates a one-way
universe where contrasting gravitational and
matter fields provide structural integrity.^ In
contrast, Pannenberg's view of time is more
traditional.^ He accepts that the universe and
time have a beginning in the finite past,^' but
rejects speculation about time preceding ex-
istence as incoherent circular reasoning.^'
Instead, he suggests that eternity simulta-
neously borders and is in contact with every
moment of time, including its spatiotemporal
beginning. Pannenberg describes eternity as
the vantage point from which all of time can
be viewed simultaneously.
Prigogine admits that his cosmological
theories are more speculation than science. "^^
Though theology is capable of tackling non-
observable problems. Pannenberg's specula-
tions about cosmology are also inconclusive.
Ultimately, Pannenberg's theology and
Prigogine's physics lead to metaphysical be-
liefs about reality beyond the observed spa-
tiotemporal universe that are not strictly com-
patible, but within the universe much less ten-
sion between Pannenberg's and Prigogine's
theories exist. In particular, Prigogine's hunch
that fields are ontologically basic may have
useful bearing on Pannenberg's theory of the
Spirit as a force field or his concept of eter-
nity. These questions suggest that further ex-
amination of Prigogine's work in the light of
Pannenberg's fourth question to scientists may
prove useful.
Despite the differences outlined above,
Prigogine's affirmative answer to
Pannenberg's second question highlights the
way in which science can bolster theological
hypotheses. On the other hand, their disagree-
ments demonstrate science's reliance on a
subjective, interpretive framework. Discus-
sions regarding cosmological models empha-
size this dependence; theology's more robust
metaphysical system provides a firmer ground
for speculation than does science's empiri-
cism.
Like most scientists, Prigogine believes
that the mathematical relationships he has dis-
covered are somehow ontologically basic and,
therefore, the key to understanding the uni-
verse and its origin. Extrapolations of this
sort invariably fail to consider the personal
aspects of reality and so cannot form truly
holistic worldviews. Theological insight may
reduce this deficit in science, though scien-
tific evidence can challenge or confirm the
speculations of theologians about how the
world works.
Prigogine's program is part of a growing
movement across disciplines to redefine how
physical processes are conceptualized. He ad-
vocates steering the "narrow path" that rejects
both Newtonian determinism and a chaotic,
meaningless universe.^ While physical laws
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are constructed by human minds, admitting
that Prigogine believes these laws are neither
arbitrary inventions nor capable of bringing
all natural phenomenon into a rational frame-
work of regularities. Regular processes acces-
sible to human thought do exist in the world.
Prigogine' s philosophical conclusions here in-
tegrate well with Pannenberg's theology.
Similarly, Pannenberg's work may be seen
as a return to a contingent natural theology in
which humans are justified in seeing God's
handiwork in phenomena such as physical
regularities and complex organic structures,
but are barred from the ability to understand
the world completely. Such complete under-
standing would require a knowledge that tran-
scends the limits of temporal being. Thus,
the world reflects God's transcendence with-
out invalidating, for instance. Ian Markham's
correct claim that belief in God necessitates
belief in a universal truth.*^
Perhaps Genesis 1:26-30 provides a Bib-
lical analog. God has given humanity reason
and the power to subdue the world and all the
things in it. Human dominion over the earth
is manifest in the (God-given) abihty to un-
derstand and manipulate the elements of the
created order. The world is not simple, but
humans can identify and systematize elements
of the world that can, for practical purposes,
be conceived as simple (e.g., the action of a
lever). Contemporary understanding of the
world, though partial, is sufficient to show that
complete knowledge of the world is humanly
(though not divinely) impossible.
The Incarnation gives meaning and pur-
pose to humanity's dominion in the world. As
Pannenberg has written, God has proleptically
revealed God's future aim in the present
through the Resurrection. The insight gained
from this revelation provides teleological pur-
pose to Christians' ability to understand the
world, a purpose that requires, for its ultimate
realization, input from both theological reflec-
tion and rational scientific attempts to uncover
rationality in the world.
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theological program see Hefner.
2. First articulated in Pannenberg et al..
Revelation as History. Pannenberg's theol-
ogy was in part a reaction to the separation of
history and theology championed by
Bultmann's demythologizing agenda.
3. A similar shift occurred in early nine-
teenth-century Europe. See Schleiermacher.
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theological approach, first popularized in
Paley, see Pollard. Contemporary quantum
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The Moral Maze, respectively.
6. Paimenberg, "Theological Questions to
Scientists," reprinted in his Towards a Theol-
ogy ofNature, pp. 15-28.
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9. Pannenberg, "The Doctrine of Creation
in Modern Science." pp. 29^9. See also
Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, pp. 69-70.
10. Pannenberg, "Contingency and Natu-
ral Law." For Pannenberg "contingent" de-
scribes phenomena that are not logically nec-
essary.
11. Pannenberg. Letter to T. Bradshaw.
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to be a contingent feature of its history.
12. Pannenberg, Systematic Tlieology, vol.
2, pp. 70-71.
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move perceived conflicts between science and
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14. Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, vol.
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15. Pannenberg. Systematic Tlieology, vol.
l,p.418.
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libria. In practice, high activation energies
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lent to minima in AH, the enthalpy or heat en-
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tively. For greater detail see Nicolis and
Prigogine.
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21. le.. the Poisson Distribution; for a defi-
nition and relevant discussion see Prigogine,
From Being to Becoming, pp. 133-38.
22. See Albert, pp. 1-21.
23. Boltzmann's equation was derived from
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24. Poincare, "La mecanique et
I'experience," and Lemons de
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Being to Becoming, pp. 155-159.
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Boltzmann's theory was open to the charge
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mates a physical system can be viewed as an
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30. This example was suggested by
Poincare in Science and Method, ch. 4.
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Prigogine and Stengers, p. 10; and Prigogine.
The End of Certainty, p. 72; for a contrary
view see Denbigh.
32. Prigogine's group proposes a detailed
mathematical formulation of the time opera-
tor in Antoniou et al.
33. For an unpacking of this somewhat
dense paragraph, see Prigogine. End of Cer-
tainty, i^t^.^9-\2^.
34. For a detailed formulation of this theory
see Petrosky and Prigogine. "Thermodynamic
Limit. Hilbert Space and Breaking of Time
Symmetry." For a less technical account see
Prigogine, "Laws of Nature, Probability, and
Time Symmetry Breaking."
35. Systems large enough to justify neglect-
ing boundary effects; see Prigogine, End of
Certainty, pp. 158-59.
36. Prigogine's earlier work refers to these
resonances as "Poincare catastrophes"; see
Prigogine, From Being to Becoming, pp. 30-
43, 191-194; cf. Prigogine, End ofCertainty,
pp. 39^3. For more detail, see Petrosky and
Prigogine, "Poincare Resonances and the
Extension of Classical Dynamics."
37. Prigogine, End ofCertainty, p. 40.
38. Ibid., p. 146.
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tion see Petrosky and Prigogine, "Quantum
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ing point coupled with a misplaced belief in
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suggestion that time depends on intuitive hu-
man perception rather than supposed physi-
cal reality see Christensen.
43. Prigogine and Stengers, p. 299.
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jectivity is critiqued in Szendrei, "Rediscov-
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artificial enviromnents, see Cartwright, pp.
1-19.49-102.
45. Prigogine and Stengers, p. 300.
46. Eg., the isotropy, simplicity, and intel-
ligibility of the physical world and the power
of mathematics to describe it. See Maxwell,
pp. 36-74.
47. As scientific books written for the gen-
eral public almost invariably do. Michael
Poole calls this the "Last Chapter phenom-
enon," in Stannard, Science and Wonders, p.
195.
48. As Imre Lakatos points out, facts them-
selves do not suggest ideas; a conceptual
framework is necessary for induction; for a
discussion of "the myth of induction" see
Lakatos, p. 73.
49. Hefner, p. 98; cf. Pannenberg, Anthro-
pology, p. 59.
50. Prigogine and Stengers, pp. 176, 190-
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Prigogine, End ofCertainty, pp. 163-66.
59. Prigogine. End ofCertainty, p. 179 and
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60. For details of Pannenberg's cosmologi-
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Prigogine agrees with Thomas Aquinas,
who famously argued that whether the world
has a beginning or not is theologically irrel-
evant; see Aquinas, I 46.1, quoted in
Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, vol. 2, p.
149.
62. Pannenberg, Metaphysics and the Idea
of God, pp. 61ff. Pannenberg's criticism is
directed at Whiteheadian Process Theology,
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63. Prigogine, End of Certainty, p. 166.
64. Ibid., ch. 9.
65. See Markham.
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